Abstract. In this paper we present the first general purpose subliminal channel that can be built into a secret symmetric cipher by a malicious designer. Subliminal channels traditionally exploit randomness that is used in probabilistic cryptosystems. In contrast, our channel is built into a deterministic block cipher, and thus it is based on a new principle. It is a broadcast channel that assumes that the sender and the receiver know the subliminal message ms (i.e., something derived from their common key). We show that the designer can expect to be able to read ms when O(|ms|log|ms|) plaintext/ciphertext pairs are obtained. Here |ms| is the length of ms in bits. We show how to turn the channel into a narrowcast channel using a deterministic asymmetric cipher and then present an application of the narrowcast channel. In this application, the secret block cipher securely and subliminally transmits the symmetric key of the sender and receiver to the malicious designer and confidentiality holds even when the cipher is made public.
Introduction
One of the central concerns, from a user's standpoint, of using a black-box cryptographic device is the possibility that the output might maliciously expose private data. Cryptosystems that contain subliminal channels allow this type of information leakage to occur. Subliminal channels have been shown to exist in digital signing algorithms, asymmetric key generation algorithms, and so forth. These channels traditionally exploit randomness in the algorithms they are built into, and more recently it has been shown how to exploit redundancies in plaintext to create such channels. The methodology behind identifying a subliminal channel within a particular cryptosystem involves identifying these features wherever they are present. However, to date, no general-purpose subliminal channel has been shown to exist in a block cipher which is a deterministic function (this holds for published as well as secret designs). In this paper we present the first general-purpose subliminal channel in secret block ciphers.
We stress again that this channel is built into a deterministic function, which contrasts with traditional subliminal channels that have been identified in probabilistic cryptosystems. Subliminal channels typically use acceptance/rejection on the random bits that are available to the cryptosystem in order to transmit the subliminal message m s in the output. A deterministic channel within a deterministic cryptosystem does not have the luxury of using random bits in this fashion, so it may seem somewhat counter-intuitive that subliminal information can be encoded in the output ciphertext.
This brings us to the nature of our channel, which is atypical and suggests that the definition of a subliminal channel should be broadened. A typical subliminal channel allows, e.g., a sender to send a subliminal message (through digital signatures for example) to a receiver unbeknownst to a passive eavesdropper. Our channel allows a sending device to send a subliminal message to a receiving device that already knows the subliminal message such that the subliminal message can be read by a known-plaintext attacker that is privy to secret information (a particular private key). Our main application is a backdoor attack against a secret block cipher that covertly leaks the asymmetric encryption of the sender and receiver's symmetric key to the cipher designer. Furthermore, the channel employed this way is robust against reverse-engineering (robust meaning that the confidentiality of encryptions still holds even if the cipher becomes public).
Due to space limitations only an overview of the other applications will be given. A second application is an attack on operating systems that share the same decryption private key within the security kernel (e.g., to decrypt encrypted programs before running them). The attack subliminally leaks the private key. A third application is an attack that subliminally leaks the private signing symmetric key of Russia to the U.S. within the Salt II Treaty verification protocol [23] .
Modern Motivations for Backdoor Research
In the past, the motivation for studying backdoors in symmetric secret ciphers was simple. The U.S. government had endorsed Skipjack, a classified block cipher [16] . RC4 is another cipher that was initially a trade secret (of RSA Data Security Inc.). Companies still engage in the practice of marketing secret ciphers under the premise that they are proprietary. So, the chief motivation for this research has not changed with time. Also, digital rights management efforts have sought to utilize software obfuscation and hardware implementations to protect digital content ([4] obfuscated a published cipher). In fact, recently Boneh et al. described a technique akin to differential fault analysis to cryptanalyze a simplied version of a software obfuscation package [10] . They suggested countermeasures to their attack and mentioned the possibility of using secret designs prior to obfuscating the code. So, the hazards of secret ciphers are still not fully observed.
Subliminal Channels and Backdoor Ciphers
To show that the notion of a subliminal channel was applicable in practice, the prisoner's problem was devised [21] . In this problem, two prisoners want to communicate subliminal messages to each other within digital signatures so that the warden, who verifies all signatures, will not know this is taking place. Solutions to this problem have been given for DSA, ElGamal, and others. Progress has been slow in subliminal channel research [6, 1] in both identifying attack possibilities as well as in formally defining the subject. Progress has also been slow, yet steady, in researching robust backdoors in cryptosystems [24, 26] . Previously, no subliminal channel of a general nature was known to exist in secret block ciphers nor in publishable block ciphers. Rijmen and Preneel gave a methodology for designing a backdoor cipher where the cipher that results has a public specification [19] . The recovery ability is based on a specific trapdoor that allows the designer to break the encryption using linear cryptanalysis. Security issues with this methodology were subsequently addressed [25] . Related work includes [17] which was cryptanalyzed in [3, 7] .
Earlier work on building backdoors into symmetric ciphers showed that a shared string between the sender and receiver (the symmetric encryption key) could be subliminally leaked. However, these designs left room for improvement. The cipher in [27] reveals multiple plaintext bits (in particular bit positions) in every ciphertext to the reverse-engineer. The backdoor presented in [28] only leaks subliminal information when the input plaintext is highly redundant and also reveals an upper or lower bound on the entropy of every plaintext to the reverse-engineer. The non-trivial security goal that we achieve in this paper is the construction of a backdoor cipher that does not leak plaintext bits to the reverse-engineer nor one that requires redundancy in plaintexts to operate correctly.
A fundamental difference between the cipher we present here and Monkey [27] is the use of pre-processing symmetric decryption in the block encryption function (Monkey uses only a post-processing encryption during block encryption). Thus, the block encryption function presented here involves both post and pre-processing tranformations in the block encryption function. This is an integral part of the mechanism that prevents the reverse-engineer from learning plaintext bits in individual bit positions. If R is given query s twice, R will respond with the same bit string.
Notation and Definitions
A random function is similar to a random oracle except that the range is defined to be a finite set. It is possible to instantiate a random function F θ :
{0, 1}
* → S where S = {0, 1, 2, ..., θ − 1} using a random oracle R as follows. Let s be a binary string. Let t be the first |θ| bits of the infinitely long string R(s). If t ∈ S then F θ (s) = t. Otherwise, consider the next |θ| bits of R(s). If this string is contained in S then this string is F θ (s), and so on. So, F θ (s) maps to an element drawn uniformly at random from S.
In practice, cryptographic hash functions are used to instantiate random oracles (and random functions). However, when a public and private string are supplied to a random function it may be desirable to use a pseudorandom function [9] instead.
A block cipher is a pair of algorithms (EN C, DEC) that is used to encrypt and decrypt plaintext messages m that are w bits in length. The encryption is performed using a key k such that for all m, the equality m = DEC(k, EN C(k, m)) holds. The function EN C must therefore be injective to allow unambiguous decryption. In a block cipher, {0, 1}
w is both the set of plaintexts as well as the set of ciphertexts. The encryption function for a block cipher is therefore a bijection (and must be deterministic). There are 2 w ! possible bijections in total over {0, 1}
w . This implies that about w2 w bits are needed to represent each possible bijection. An ideal random cipher is a w-bit block cipher that implements all 2 w ! bijections on 2 w elements. Each of the 2 w ! keys specifies one such permutation [15] . However, a key size of about w2 w bits is highly impractical. So, a weaker definition of a cipher is needed for practical purposes.
An ideal classic cipher implements a randomly chosen subset of all 2 w ! permutations from the message space onto the ciphertext space. They are secure against chosen-plaintext attacks. It is standard practice to make the cardinality of the key space exponential in some security parameter. A design principle for a block cipher is to make the cipher as close to an ideal classic cipher as possible. A block cipher is "secure" in some sense, if the encryption function corresponding to a randomly selected key appears to be a randomly chosen invertible function (pseudorandom permutation). The notion of choosing a block cipher at random is as follows. If the subset of permutations can be chosen randomly, then a w-bit ideal classic cipher can be chosen randomly.
Kerckhoffs' basic principle is that the adversary will somehow learn the details of the cipher. So in principle, all of the secrecy should reside in the key. A secret block cipher, in contrast, is a block cipher in which EN C and DEC are known only to the designer, unless an implementation of the cipher is reverseengineered. However, the key space, message space, and ciphertext space are publicly known. A secret block cipher is a gross violation of Kerckhoffs' principle, and it is this that motivates the present investigation. Namely, we strive to justify this principle from the perspective of information leakage attacks.
Recall that IND-CPA stands for Indistinguishability -chosen-plaintext attack. In an IND-CPA attack, the adversary first mounts a CPA attack. The adversary then submits two plaintexts of his choice to the encryption oracle and is then given the encryption of one of the two at random and is asked to guess which plaintext was encrypted. A cipher is IND-CPA secure if the adversary guesses correctly with probability negligibly greater than 1/2.
New Definitions and Building Blocks
Informally, a broadcast block cipher is a block cipher that broadcasts a subliminal message m s to everyone that knows the algorithm for the cipher. The bit string m s must be supplied as input (e.g., internally) to the broadcast encryption algorithm as well as the broadcast decryption algorithm. Define BEN C(k, m, k s , m s ) to be a broadcast block cipher with a w-bit block size, where m is the plaintext, k is the symmetric key used to encrypt m, m s is the subliminal message, and k s is a secret key.
Our threat model involves four entities that we define informally yet intuitively (a more formal definition will be given in the full version). The role of each of these entities is as follows.
The designer is a malicious entity that is permitted to design and deploy the black-box device. Therefore, the designer only has write-once and oracle access to the device. The goal of the designer is to learn m s . The designer supplies the secret key k s and the collected plaintext/ciphertext pairs to an algorithm called BREC which then returns the subliminal message m s .
The reverse-engineer has only oracle access to the device (i.e., the cipher can't be changed). The reverse-engineer mounts a chosen-plaintext attack. Upon completion of the attack the reverse-engineer knows α plaintext/ciphertext pairs denoted by (
It is assumed that these ciphertexts subliminally transmit m s . So, the reverseengineer knows BEN C, BDEC, m s , k s as well as the pairs (m 1 , c 1 ),...,(m α , c α ). The goal of the reverse-engineer is to break the cipher by learning a non-negligible amount of plaintext information.
The inquirer and sampler have only oracle access to the cipher. The inquirer is a boolean function. An output of true indicates a guess that the cipher is an ideal classic cipher. An output of false indicates a guess that it is not an ideal classic cipher (e.g., that it contains a subliminal channel and as a result appears less than ideal).
There exists a set of weak probability distributions in the broadcast block cipher that breaks the confidentiality of encryptions with respect to the reverseengineer. The purpose of formalizing the sampler is to show that with overwhelming probability a weak distribution will not be selected (by users in practice). The sampler chooses a probability distribution over the message space and returns plaintexts sampled accordingly.
So, the inquirer is a user (adversary) that tries to distinguish between "good" and "bad" ciphers and the sampler is a user (adversary) that tries to choose a probability distribution that allows the reverse-engineer to violate the confidentiality of encryptions. It is assumed that the reverse-engineer, inquirer, and sampler are computationally bounded. Property (2) guarantees that decryption will always yield the original plaintext. The secret key k s is fixed and is contained in all of the black-box devices. This value must be kept secret (hence, the subscript "s") by the designer to prevent users from being able to read the channel. The reverse-engineer knows k s and so the reverse-engineer can read the subliminal channel. So, it is a broadcast channel. It is made narrowcast using the deterministic asymmetric encryption function E. In our main application we set m s = E(y, k) where y is the designer's public key. Clearly E(y, k) can be reconstructed by BEN C and BDEC on input k. Since only the designer knows the decryption private key corresponding to y, only the designer (and not the reverse-engineer) can learn k.
Property (4) implies that a sufficient number of known plaintext-ciphertext pairs under a common key k are required in order to read m s . Observe that this construction constitutes a cipher within a cipher. The secret key k s acts like a symmetric key that decrypts the "ciphertext" (m 1 , m 2 , ..., m α , c 1 , c 2 The pair (EN C1, DEC1) is a secret ideal classic cipher with a w-bit block size. Let δ be a constant. The pair (EN C2, DEC2) is a secret ideal classic cipher with block size w − δ bits. We are somewhat lax about specifying the set from which the symmetric keys k are drawn. The set is typically, say {0, 1}
128 or an even larger set. These ciphers can be instantiated using a pseudorandom invertible permutation generator that will make the outputs secure against chosen plaintext attacks [13] . In practice, symmetric ciphers often utilize Feistel transformations. Luby and Rackoff have provided some theoretical justification for Feistel's construction [12, 11] .
The Broadcast Block Cipher
The broadcast block encryption algorithm is given in Fig. 1 .
Fig. 1. Subliminal Channel in Block Encryption Algorithm
(Intuitive Description). The channel transmits one pseudorandomly chosen bit of the subliminal message in each ciphertext block that is output. First, a large portion of the block is simply encrypted using a secure block cipher. The resulting ciphertext is recoverable under a known plaintext attack by the reverseengineer. This block is used as the "public" input to a random function.
2 This public input is used to select a bit position randomly in the subliminal message. The problem that remains is to display the subliminal bit in this bit position. This is accomplished by embedding this bit in the encryption of the remaining plaintext that has not been enciphered. To do so, the public input is again supplied to a random function, but this time the user's symmetric key is supplied to the random function as well. The result is a random pad that is used to XOR encrypt all but the last remaining plaintext bit. This bit is also XOR encrypted. This is accomplished by supplying the pad along with the public input to yet another random function, to obtain a one bit pad. The idea is that the larger pad is secret due to the secrecy of the user's symmetric key, and so this larger pad can be used to derive a secret one-bit pad to XOR encrypt the final plaintext bit. An initial permutation and a final permutation are also performed for reasons that will become clear later on.
(Detailed Description). The pair k s = (k α , k β ) is randomly chosen by the designer and is placed in the black-box device that implements BEN C and BDEC (so k s may become known to a reverse-engineer but the symmetric key k that the user supplies to the device will not). For simplicity it is assumed that w is even. The value δ is an integer constant used in the broadcast block cipher. The function f is defined as follows. Since each bit is selected uniformly at random from the |m s | bit positions, the designer (and the reverse-engineer) can expect to have to obtain O(|m s |log|m s |) plaintext/ciphertext pairs under a common key k in order to recover m s . This results from analyzing the first moment of the coupon collector's problem [8] . It follows that property (4) of Definition 2 holds (designer completeness). We call this the insignis channel, named after the carnivorous plant Nepenthes Insignis Danser.
Security
The following claim is used to show that indistinguishability (i.e., property (1) of Definition 2) holds.
Proof. Assume for the sake of contradiction that this does not hold. Then there exists k, m s , k α , m 1 , and m 2 where m 1 = m 2 such that
Observe that α is a permutation of the input message. So, m 1 maps to α 1 and m 2 maps to α 2 where α 1 = α 2 . Define α u,1 , α ,1 , α u,2 , α ,2 , β u,1 , β ,1 , β u,2 , and β ,2 as follows: ·) is a permutation it follows that β u,1 = β u,2 . Hence, β 1 = β 2 in this case. So, it remains to consider the case that α u,1 = α u,2 .
Since α 1 = α 2 it must be the case that α ,1 = α ,2 . It is not hard to show that pad is the same for m 1 and m 2 . Since α ,1 = α ,2 it follows that the strings resulting from the bitwise XOR operation differ. Therefore, β ,1 = β ,2 . It follows that β 1 = β 2 . Therefore, in all cases β 1 = β 2 which is a contradiction.
Let m s be any subliminal message and let k s be any secret key. Claim 1 shows that EN C(k, m) maps each m ∈ {0, 1} w under k to one and only one β ∈ {0, 1} w . EN C then encrypts β using a randomly chosen key k β in a randomly chosen ideal classic cipher. Hence, this last operation is a randomly chosen permutation from among the set of possible random permutations in the ideal classical cipher. Since the composition of two permutations is a permutation and since k β is secret, we have therefore shown the following.
Claim 2. A secret implementation of (EN C, DEC) is indistinguishable from an ideal classic cipher.
It follows that property 1 of Definition 2 holds. The following corollary follows from Claim 2 and the notion of security for an ideal classic cipher.
Corollary 1. With only oracle access, EN C appears like a randomly chosen invertible function.
(EN C, DEC) is as secure as EN C1 against attacks mounted by a user since the key k β is secret from the user. Therefore, since (EN C1, DEC1) is secure against chosen-plaintext attacks mounted by the user (note that it is first [14] ) (EN C, DEC) is secure against chosen-plaintext attacks mounted by the user. We will now consider the security of (EN C, DEC) when attacks are carried out by the reverse-engineer who knows k β , among other things. Thus, the remainder of this section is devoted to showing that property (3) of Definition 2 holds.
First, note that β u is the block encryption of α u . So, the encryption using EN C2 will not compromise k u unless EN C2 is itself vulnerable to a chosen plaintext attack. Now consider the confidentiality of α .
Observe that in (EN C, DEC) there exist non-trivial distributions M p that compromise plaintexts. These M p 's lead to a non-negligible probability of collision in β u . A collision in β u implies a collision in pad. So, we must first show that the chances that the sampler compromises its own plaintexts is negligible.
Define p c to be the probability that two messages m 1 and m 2 that are chosen according to M p lead to the same value for β u in the corresponding encryptions c 1 and c 2 . If p c is not negligible then the sampler may produces messages that are compromised. This results from the fact that the random functions in f would be given the same β u thereby resulting in a selection of pads for c 1 and c 2 that are not only dependent, but identical. Claim 3 utilizes a fact that is related to the birthday paradox. An urn has u balls numbered from 1 to u. Suppose that v balls are drawn from the urn one at a time, with replacement, and their numbers are listed. (Fact 1) A well-known fact is that as u → ∞, the expected number of draws before a coincidence is (πu)/2. Proof. Assume that EN C1 is an ideal classic cipher for sufficiently large w. It follows that DEC1 is a bijection and so every message maps to one and only one α. Also, assume that w − δ is sufficiently large.
Since EN C2 is an ideal classic cipher, each α u is assigned randomly to a β u under the random permutation EN C2(k u , ·) . It follows from Corollary 1 that the sampler can do no better than guess a value for M p that has a non-negligible probability of yielding a collision in β u when sampled. So, it remains to consider the probability of a collision for randomly chosen β u 's.
The value β u is selected randomly from a set with cardinality 2 w−δ . It follows from Fact 1 that the expected number of ciphertexts needed to have a collision in β u is close to 2
π/2. Since w − δ is sufficiently large it follows that with overwhelming probability the β u 's will be unique. Hence, p c is negligible.
This analysis implies that w − δ should be at least 128.
Observe that the function f is known to the reverse-engineer since H δ−1 and F 1 are public. From property (4) of Definition 2 it follows that m s is known to the reverse-engineer. It is not hard to show that b and β u are known to the reverse-engineer for every ciphertext. This implies that k is a private input and (b, β u ) is a public input (from the reverse-engineer's perspective) to f . Proof. Assume that k is secret from the reverse-engineer. Also, assume that p c is negligible. It follows from the latter assumption that the β u 's are different with overwhelming probability. Consider the event that the β u 's differ.
Since the β u 's differ, the δ − 1 uppermost bits of pad are selected uniformly at random and independent of every other plaintext. This follows from the fact that β u is supplied as input to the random function H δ−1 . Furthermore, the δ − 1 uppermost bits H δ−1 (k || β u ) of pad are secret due to the secret k that is supplied as input to H δ−1 in f .
Since the β u 's differ, for each β u , the least significant bit of pad is selected uniformly at random and independent of every other plaintext. This follows from the fact that β u is supplied as input to the random function F 1 . Furthermore, the least significant bit of pad is secret since it was shown that H δ−1 (k || β u ) is secret and this value is supplied as input to
This analysis implies that δ should not be less than 64. The assumption here is that 64 is an acceptable security parameter, which even today is arguably cutting it close. We remark that Rijndael has block sizes of 128, 192, and 256 bits [5] . So, a block size of 192 bits or larger is not unreasonable. Also, the bits that comprise pad are the outputs of a random oracle, so they will not compromise k . Claims 3 and 4 show that even if the computationally bounded sampler wants to find an M p that compromises plaintexts, the probability that the sampler finds such an M p is negligible. Now consider the case that the reverse-engineer mounts a known-plaintext attack. Recall that in a known plaintext attack the reverse-engineer queries an encryption oracle (the sampler) and receives S = {(m 1 , c 1 ), (m 2 , c 2 . The values α = α u || α are encrypted using k α in the cipher EN C1. This yields a set of new plaintexts for EN C. The reverse-engineer computes the corresponding ciphertexts in the same way that EN C would. The number of plaintext/ciphertext pairs that can be learned by the reverse-engineer is bounded by a polynomial in the length of ((m 1 , c 1 ) , ..., (m γ , c γ ), k s ) which is provided as "input" to the computationally bounded reverse-engineer.
This attack also applies to IND-CPA attacks. Note that when the encryption oracle EN C(k, ·) is taken away, the reverse-engineer is able to make oracle queries to EN C1(k α , ·) and learn more plaintext/ciphertext pairs. The reverseengineer can take one of the new plaintext/ciphertext pairs, make the IND-CPA oracle request with the new plaintext, and then distinguish perfectly. For this reason we use a weaker notion of confidentiality than IND-CPA in Definition 2.
However, by taking the probability over the coin tosses of when EN C1 was generated, it follows that the new plaintexts that are learned are random (EN C1 is an ideal classic cipher). So, the reverse-engineer can only sample the new plaintext/ciphertext pairs randomly. Under these arguments, property (3) of Definition 2 holds.
Theorem 1. (BEN C, BDEC, BREC) is a broadcast block cipher.

Kleptographic Attack
This section describes how to carry out a kleptographic attack that leaks k exclusively to the designer. Let (E, D) be a deterministic asymmetric cryptosystem, let y be the public key of the malicious designer and let x be the corresponding private key. The ciphertext c = E(y, m) denotes the encryption of m. To decrypt we compute m = D(x, c).
In the attack, the cipher computes m s = E(y, k). The designer computes k = D(x, m s ). The reverse-engineer has access to (m s , y, E) but does not have access to x. So, the broadcast subliminal channel is tranformed into a narrowcast channel using y and E. Clearly other information besides k can be leaked this way as well. The notion of a SETUP is given in [26] . We have therefore shown the following. E(y, k) is a SETUP attack against the secret w-bit block cipher (EN C, DEC).
Lemma 1. The subliminal transmission of
Conclusion
The notion of a broadcast subliminal channel in a block cipher was introduced and an instantiation was given for secret block ciphers. The channel broadcasts a subliminal message to the reverse-engineer and the malicious designer. It was shown how to turn the broadcast channel into a narrow cast channel using a deterministic asymmetric cipher. In the narrowcast construction, only the malicious designer can obtain the plaintext message. An application of the narrowcast channel was given that constitutes the first secretly embedded trapdoor attack against a deterministic block cipher.
